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Introduction 
The purpose of this dissertation is to analyze the Greek electricity market, in order 
one to obtain the necessary familiarity, with the way it, nowadays, operates. 
Furthermore, a bibliographical review, of the most prominent strategies to address the 
problem of producers' and system's cost optimization, is presented, focusing in the 
review of gaming theory models and their distinct properties.  
Given the global trend for liberalization of the energy sector, as it has proven so far to 
operate in a more efficient manner, the Greek case presents a special interest in 
investigating, which could be the benefits of such liberalization in the Greek energy 
sector of electricity. 
The energy sector in Greece holds as a state monopoly since 1956, when Public 
Power Corporation was founded. Since then, PPC has been solely responsible for the 
production and distribution of electricity in Greece. Taking into consideration that, 
monopolies and especially state monopolies, effectively lack competition, a series of 
problems surface. Expensive products and services with relatively low quality, 
inefficient utilization of resources and investments, state intervention in prices and 
policies, are some of the most prominent distortions, in this market state. 
With the integration of the EC directive 96/92/EC in the Greek legislation, electricity 
sector became accessible to private sector's electricity producers. An independent 
authority was established (Regulatory Authority of Energy), which monitors the 
operation of the energy market and tries to ensure the healthy competition of 
companies in the sector. Another authority called Operator of Electricity Market 
(LAGIE S.A.), is responsible for day to day programming of energy requirements of 
the System, that include the hourly pricing of electricity (in wholesale market) and the 
contribution of each producer to the System, having a set goal of pricing 
minimization. 
Although more than 12 years have passed since electricity market has been 
liberalized, the major player in the Greek electricity sector, remains PPC. A few 
minor players have risen also, but the fact remains, that PPC leads the market and 
pricing of electricity. This calls for contribution of the private sector, in order to 
attract new investments in networks and Renewable Energy Sources, with a final goal 
to achieve cheaper and environmentally friendlier services for the final cosnumers. 
Gaming theory examines situations, where there is interaction between a small 
number of individuals (players), so any decisions and strategies followed by a player, 
affects the decisions and strategies followed by the others, having a major player and 
a few minors. By this logic, finally an equilibrium is established among them, 
regarding their profit objectives. This theory has a number of applications, ranging 
from the economics and business sector to everyday relations and military decisions. 
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The electricity market as described previously, can be considered as a system that 
consists of players (major and minors), that their aim is to maximize their profit 
functions, through interaction with each other. In other words, as an oligopoly, that 
the electricity market is, the gaming theory can be applied, in order to predict the 
equilibrium point of pricing, regarding various scenarios. 
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1. Energy market analysis 
The electric energy market has had always, quite a monopoly character, as certain 
companies vertically integrated, were responsible for the production, transfer and 
distribution of the electric energy, in certain geographic areas. These companies were 
either state owned or privately held. During the last decades, and especially the last 
two, drastic changes occurred in the electric power providers' sector worldwide, as 
these monopoly markets were starting to progressively being replaced by liberated 
markets, were there is now competition among various companies. Those changes 
occurred in different timeline horizons and were depended on the various local 
specifities, such as technological-environmental, economic and political reasons. 
As far as technological and environmental reasons concerned, technology's rapid 
growth rate, played a significant role in the energy sector. The development of high 
voltage grids during the decades 60-80's, made possible the transfer of high quantities 
of electricity in long distances, giving in this way, the opportunity to various 
producers to enter the energy market and to reach remotely final consumers [9]. Also, 
as the cost of building power units at the previous years, was extremely high, the only 
viable investors, were the monopolies themselves. New inventions, such as combined 
cycle turbines, lead to a significant reduction of the investment cost, as well as the 
construction time of the investment, allowing smaller companies to enter the power 
production sector [10]. Finally, especially in the last decade, the renewable energy 
production power units, which belong to a large number of small producers, rise their 
number, as they are receive state grants for their production. 
The financial reasons, are basically reasons that apply in most markets. In theory, a 
competitive market, which operates correctly, can guarantee production cost 
minimization and simultaneously as low as possible, average energy prices[9]. 
According to theory, a liberated market can give more incentives to the producers, in 
order to minimize their costs and can easier lead the prices close to marginal cost, in 
comparison to a regulated energy market. In order to have the abovementioned 
advantages, the energy market itself, must have been designed to work with a specific 
set of rules. In countries with a significant state debt and state monopoly in the energy 
sector, the needed investments, could not proceed, in order to cover the needs[11]. By 
privatizing, the electric energy production industry, allowed them to reallocate funds, 
in other critical state sectors or to the payout of their debt. 
The first liberated markets proved that the energy sector can function in a competitive 
market [12]. That fact influenced politics and politicians, and in conjunction with the 
belief that privately owned companies appear to allocate more effectively their 
resources, than stated owned ones, increased the pressure for reforming the energy 
markets, in more countries. To that end, significant role had various international 
organizations, such as International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. 
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Historically, the first country to proceed in the liberation of the energy market, was 
Chile in 1982. At that time, it gave the capability to large final consumers to chose 
their own supplier and to negotiate their pricing. Furthermore, it constructed explicit 
mechanisms that set the suppliers' production and the wholesale pricing [14]. With 
these two simple steps, Chile managed to create competitive conditions among 
producers and to reform the energy sector in a short time. The successful story of 
Chile, lead other countries of the region to follow its steps and liberate their energy 
markets. From 1992 to 1997, Argentina, Peru, Colombia, Bolivia and the countries of 
Central America, were making similar changes in their energy markets, trying to 
emerge a new competitive energy market. The countries of this wider region, are at 
the stage of forming alliances, in order to cover large portions of the continent and 
further develop the energy market [15]. 
In Europe, England was the first country to proceed to the liberation of the energy 
market, by starting the privatization of the energy sector in 1989. In 1994, they 
formed a market that every consumer could participate over the power of 100 MW. In 
1998 the energy market was 100% liberated at all its sectors. At the year 2001, 
English and Wales energy market, were merged into the New Electricity Trading 
Arrangements (NETA), which is the name of the system under which electricity is 
traded in the United Kingdom's electricity system. Norway made its first steps in 
liberating its energy market in the year 1990. Norway and Sweden, which started 
reforming its market in 1995, founded the Nord Pool in 1996, which was more 
flexible than the English market. This consortium joined Finland in 1998, western 
Denmark in 1999 and the eastern Denmark in the year 2000. Today Nord Pool Spot 
runs the leading power market in Europe and offers both day-ahead and intraday 
markets to its customers. 370 companies from 20 countries trade on the market. In 
2012 the group had a total turnover of 432 TWh, which includes the auction volume 
in the UK market N2EX. Its successful course, represents one of the best examples of 
liberated energy market.  
In the US, the most well known effort to liberate the electric energy sector, is the one 
in California. At 1998 40% of power production was sold to independent producers 
and an energy exchange market was founded, in order to have day-to-day 
transactions. At the year 2000, the wholesale market was liberated but not the retail 
one. At that time it was considered that the retail prices would always remain higher 
than the ones that are being negotiated in the wholesale market, at the exchange 
market. That was a fact that was true for the period 1998-2000 and lead to large 
profits for the industry. However, companies did not proceed to any investments, 
regarding the increase of their production portfolio. While, the demand of electricity 
was rapidly growing, companies could barely cover the demand, and with an 
increasing cost in the wholesale market. At some point, they were forced to import 
energy from other nearby states, at a very high cost-higher than the fixed retail one. 
This distortion lead to various speculations at the energy exchange market, which had 
as a result continuous black-outs, in the state of California, in 2001 [13]. The 
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California example of deregulation of energy market, shows clearly, that in order to 
have a positive effect, the rules of the game must be well designed and revised, in 
time and taking into consideration all the concerning parties. 
In the rest of the European Union, the energy market liberation started at 1996 with 
the Directive 69/92/EC, which predicted full deregulation in all its member countries, 
by the July of the year 2007. Although the Directive set certain targets and rules, it 
didn't impose a specific common strategy in its members, which had as a result, to 
have different course and outcomes in each country members. The abovementioned 
Directive has now been replaced by the 2009/72/EC. Today there are countries in the 
European Union, where the energy markets have been fully liberated and others-such 
as Greece-that have yet some more ground to cover. The final goal is to create an 
Internal Energy Market (IEM), as far as the electricity is concerned [17]. In this way, 
greater competition conditions will be achieved, that they can guarantee better and 
cheaper service level for the final consumer, but also, a more environmental friendly 
policy in the production, transfer and distribution of the electric power, across 
European Union.     
The different liberation rate of each country, is not the only major problem across the 
European energy map. The inadequate transferring network infrastructure across the 
European geographical area, has as a result, much different accessing costs among the 
grid administrators. Furthermore, the pricing policies of the natural gas, have not 
followed an according liberalization rate to the electrical energy sector. These two 
major obstacles, lead to major concentration of the producers' potential and the 
importers of natural gas, in a few companies that benefit existing business ventures. 
In any case and in any policy followed towards the liberation of an energy sector, 
there is a common denominator of actions and structural elements that have been 
followed. First of all, the production, transfer and distribution of the electrical energy, 
consist services that must be provided by different and distinct legal entities / 
companies. Furthermore, in the energy production sector, there must be competition 
without discrimination and individualized obstacles, in order each and every investor 
to have the capability to invest, having unprohibited access to the networks. The 
transferring network however, due to the significant amounts of investments that 
require, and for certain environmental policy reasons, require to function in a 
monopoly state, excepting nevertheless the sectors of production and distribution. 
Equal treatment against the companies that are part of these markets, require the 
presence of an Independent System Operator (ISO) of the transferring grid, which has 
a wide area of responsibilities [18]. In this case, there is no direct communication 
among the suppliers and the consumers and the Independent System Operator is 
responsible for gathering the energy offers and defines the market price in the most 
economically effective way, by certain well established criteria.  
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The energy sector in Greece holds as a state monopoly since 1956 [6], when Public 
Power Corporation was founded. Since then, PPC has been solely responsible for the 
production, transfer and distribution of electricity in Greece. Taking into 
consideration that, monopolies and especially state monopolies, effectively lack 
competition, a series of problems surface. Expensive products and services with 
relatively low quality, inefficient utilization of resources and investments, state 
intervention in prices and policies, are some of the most prominent distortions, in this 
market state. Due to the monopoly state until recently, there is a lack of comparison 
data with other similar sector companies in Greece and there is a little, if not any at 
all, state economic incentives, in order privately owned companies to proceed in 
investments and benefit the consumers, both in retail and wholesale market.   
With the integration of the European Union Directive 96/92/EC in the Greek 
legislation, electricity sector became accessible to private sector's electricity 
producers. Initially, the industrial consumers' market was liberalized and some 
operation permits for private power stations where issued to investors. In accordance 
to the Directive an independent authority was established (Regulatory Authority of 
Energy) [7,8], that monitors the operation of the energy market and tries to ensure the 
healthy competition of companies in the sector. However, Regulatory Authority of 
Energy does not have a judiciary role but acts as an equal opportunity imposer, to the 
sum of the energy sector parties and consults the supervising Energy Sector Ministry. 
Another authority called Operator of Electricity Market (LAGIE S.A.), is responsible 
for day to day programming of energy requirements of the System, that include the 
hourly pricing of electricity (in wholesale market) and the contribution of each 
producer to the System, having a set goal of pricing minimization. 
Liberalization of the energy sector in Greece lacks significant progress in relevance 
with most of the European Union countries, for various reasons. Interconnections with 
other countries are insufficient. Furthermore, Greece is highly depended on imported 
fuel, in its energy mix and the prices of this fuel is still high. Liberalization of the 
natural gas sector, has yet to be achieved. Most importantly, political resolutions that 
facilitate the state owned Public Power Corporation, maintain the leading status of the 
later, having as a result the perpetuation of the existing distortions. Although more 
than 13 years have passed since electricity market has been liberalized, the major 
player in the Greek electricity sector, remains PPC. A few minor players have risen 
also, but the fact remains, that PPC leads the market and pricing of electricity. This 
calls for contribution of the private sector, in order to attract new investments in 
networks and Renewable Energy Sources, with a final goal to achieve cheaper and 
environmentally friendlier services for the customers.  
Any attempt made so far, to privatize or merge with privately owned companies of the 
sector, has proven to be in vain and it keeps getting postponed. The international 
experience is this field, suggests certain key steps to be followed. First of all, there is 
the need to attract international funds by private investors, which can be achieved 
through strategic alliances and mergers. Also, it is imperative to integrate the 
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Renewable Energy Sources to the system, in a way that is beneficiary both to the 
environment and to the final consumers' cost. The natural gas market must be in 
compliance with the general electricity market, as they are highly interconnected and 
affecting each other costs significantly.  
The benefits resulting from the previous goals, are naturally significant. Reduction of 
production power cost, as well as the total cost regarding the true service cost for the 
final consumer. Furthermore, increasing business ventures and investments, in the 
energy sector itself and supporting to that sector, fields, will lead to an increasing 
multiplier factor that will result in increasing the liquidity of the market, in creating 
new job opportunities, in the stability of the energy system and could put Greece in 
the European map of the energy rivalry sector. 
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2. Authorities & Participants of Greek Electricity Market 
Since the legislation regarding electric energy sector liberalization passed in 2001, 
excepting not interconnected islands with the mainland transferring system, there has 
been in place the right of free negotiations that lead to procurement contracts of 
electricity, by private independent producers. 
The main authorities and participants of the Greek energy market model, are the 
following: 
a. Regulatory Authority of Energy (RAE), that monitors the operation of the energy 
market and tries to ensure the healthy competition of companies in the sector. 
However, Regulatory Authority of Energy does not have a judiciary role but acts as 
an equal opportunity imposer, to the sum of the energy sector parties and consults the 
supervising Energy Sector Ministry. 
b. Operator of Electricity Market (LAGIE S.A.), is responsible for conducting the 
Daily Energy Programming of the System, that includes the hourly pricing of 
electricity and the contribution of each producer to the System, having a set goal of 
pricing minimization. Also, it’s responsible for the financial transactions between the 
corresponding parties, provides equal access for any interested party in the energy 
market according to legislation avoiding discrimination, produces to all the 
participants and in time, every piece of necessary information regarding their 
participation in the Electricity Market, cooperates with the Independent Power 
Transmission Operator and the Hellenic Electricity Distribution Network Operator 
regarding financial and technical issues and generally applies the set of rules that 
derive from the Electricity Market legislation.     
c. Independent Power Transmission Operator (ADMIE S.A.), performs the duties of 
System operation maintenance and development so as to ensure Greece’s electricity 
supply in a safe, efficient and reliable manner. 
d. Hellenic Electricity Distribution Network Operator (DEDDHE S.A.), is responsible 
for the operation, maintenance and development of the power distribution network in 
Greece, as well as the assurance of a transparent and impartial access of consumers 
and of all network users in general. 
e. Public Power Corporation (DEI S.A.), the biggest power producer and electricity 
supply company in Greece with approximately 7.4 million customers that holds the 
80.58% (April 2014) of the total installed power, excluding the installed power of the 
Renewable Energy Sources, mainly state owned.  
f. A few independent private electricity producers and energy traders, which hold a 
relatively small fraction of the Market. 
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Through the Wholesale Market are carried out transactions, regarding electricity and 
supplementary services that will be produced, consumed and used or transferred in the 
Market, in an everyday hourly basis. This consists a Mandatory Pool Market model. 
In the Greek Wholesale Electricity market, participate the following: 
 
a. The Infusers of Electricity in the System, both Producers and Importers from 
international grid interconnections. 
They are the Producers and Importers from international grid interconnections, which 
are qualified by the Regulatory Authority of Energy and hold the appropriate 
production permits, to fulfill their role. 
Each holder of a production permit is bound to submit to the Operator of Electricity 
Market, separately for each of its Power Units, a fully bounding Infuser Offer for each 
Hourly Period of each Day and for the total amount of the Power of the Unit. 
Actually, this offer is represented by a curve that is a scaling function of price and 
respected quantity of electricity.  
In the Wholesale Market, the competition is held among the Infusing parties. The 
Infusers that participate in the energy market are paid all in the same price, which is 
the Marginal System Price (M.S.P.), regardless the amount of energy they infuse. The 
gain earned by the Daily Energy Programming (D.E.P.), is equal to the difference 
between M.S.P. and the Infuser Offers that were submitted in the Operator. Producers 
offering a higher price than M.S.P. are left out of Market and don’t produce 
electricity, for the specific time frame. Producers’ competition, lead to the formation 
of the M.S.P. and to the selection of the lowest electricity price offers, as would be 
analyzed subsequently.  
     
b. Receivers of Electricity from the System, both Suppliers and Exporters to 
international grid interconnections & Self-supplied consumers. 
The role of the Receivers in the electricity Market, is to correlate the Wholesale 
Market with the Retail Market.  
Receivers buy electricity in the M.S.P. and compete with each other in Retail, in order 
to attract as many final consumers as possible, by offering them advantageous tariffs. 
Apparently, competitors form their tariff offers by profiling certain consumer 
categories and try to meet their demands through competitive pricing. Certainly, their 
pricing policy should not lead to tariffs much higher than M.S.P., but higher enough 
in order to obtain a fair profit, which represents capital gain and risk undertaken 
against their clients/final consumers. 
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Electricity Consumers 
The liberalized electricity market in Greece, gives consumers the right to choose an 
electricity supplier, which meets their demands, without any risk regarding their 
continuous electricity feeding. Certain consumers, have also the right to bypass 
suppliers and buy electricity in the M.S.P. level, directly through the Wholesale 
Market, undertaking this way, the risk of the hourly fluctuations of the M.S.P.. 
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3. Electricity Market Operation 
The Electricity Market Operation could be summarized as follows: 
 The Infusers of Electricity sell their electricity to the Operator of Electricity 
Market. 
 The Operator of Electricity Market sells electricity to the Receivers of 
Electricity, such as Public Power Corporation (which both produces and sells 
electricity to retail market and via interconnections exports it). 
 The Receivers of electricity (i.e. electricity suppliers for the internal Greek 
market and exporters), offer contracted electricity tariffs to the final 
consumers. 
The Infusers of Electricity (i.e. producers and importers), submit to the Operator for 
every hour of the upcoming day, offers in the form of couples that consist of quantity 
Q in MW and price p in €/MWh. These offers are ranked in an ascending order, thus 
forming the total offer scaling curve of the Infusers. 
 
3.1 Daily Energy Programming (D.E.P.) or Day Ahead Scheduling 
(D.A.S.) 
D.E.P. constitutes the first stage of conducting electricity transactions. It refers to 
operation programming of thermal units, hydroelectric units and the various 
Renewable Energy Sources units, as well as the utilization of international 
interconnections. The one responsible for the DEP is the System Operator and during 
the DEP, a compare takes place between the total electric power required by the 
system and the financial infusion offers made, in order to cover in daily basis : 
i) the demand for electricity by the consumers 
ii) the demand for electricity exports to other countries 
iii) the auxiliary services in the financially optimum cost   
Participation in the DEP is mandatory for the Infusers and the Receivers of electricity, 
in order to make financial transactions, that however, concern day-to-day trading and 
not long-term contracts. 
The objective of DEP is the minimization of the total cost for the coverage of 
electricity needs in each Scheduled Day. This minimization implies the fact that this 
takes place under proper and safe operation of the System and ensuring that sufficient 
backups are contemplated, in order to cover the anticipated electrical load that 
infusers offer. Any proceedings and transactions refer to every hour of each 
Scheduled Day and are completed within the preceding day (Day Ahead Scheduling).  
DEP includes the 3 following Markets:  
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i) the Energy Market, which covers the quantitative needs of the consumers in 
electricity for each scheduled Day and participate all the Infusers (holding thermal, 
hydroelectrical and Renewable Energy Sources units) and Receivers of electricity, 
ii) the Auxiliary Services Market, which covers consumers’ needs in ensuring the 
proper quality and reliability of their electricity feeding and involves the voltage and 
frequency variation within technically acceptable limits and participate all the Infusers 
(holding thermal and hydroelectrical units) and Receivers of electricity, 
iii) the Market Mechanism, which covers the need for establishing production units as 
close as possible to the major consumers. The major consumers in Greece are located 
in Southern Greece, opposing the fact that most of the production is held in Northern 
Greece. Through this mechanism, the compensation of the producers of the Southern 
System is amplified, against that of the Northern System, during the periods that large 
amounts of offers are made from the Northern producers.   
By embedding in the DEP, the necessary costs of the Auxiliary Services and the 
technical restrictions of the System, which in certain periods limit the quantity of 
electricity which is transferred from the North to the South, reveals the true total cost 
of the consumed electricity, taking into consideration quantitative (volume and time 
of the consumed electricity) and qualitative (frequency, voltage, proper quality and 
reliability of electrical feeding) characteristics.  
 
3.2 Solving Daily Energy Programming (D.E.P.) 
Solving DEP, results to the determination of the way, that each and every power unit 
of the System for every hour of the day will operate, taking into consideration the 
Infuser Offers in order to maximize the Social Surplus
1
 or more simply, to minimize 
the total electricity production cost that meets consumers’ demands, the auxiliary 
services costs and the technical limitations of the System. The Social Surplus is 
                                                          
1
 In economics theory, Consumer Surplus (CS) Consumer surplus is defined as the difference between 
the consumers' willingness to pay for a commodity and the actual price paid by them, or the 
equilibrium price. It equals to the usefulness U(Q) of a good minus the expenditure to acquire 
quantity Q of this good at a price P :   CS = U(Q) – P∙Q  
 
From the business point of view that produces the product, a Producer Surplus (PS) is created, that 
equals to the revenue from selling the product in quantity Q at a price P, minus the production costs 
C(Q):   PS = P∙Q – C(Q) 
 
Social Surplus (SS) is defined as the sum of the Consumer Surplus and the Producer Surplus, as 
depicted by the following equation : 
 
SS = U(Q) – C(Q) 
 
It reflects the benefit gained from the transaction based on the value the consumer places on the 
good. It is positive when what the consumer is willing to pay for the commodity is greater than the 
actual price. 
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optimized with the maximization of the value of the demanded power minus the 
production cost, the auxiliary services and certain other limitations.  
 
 
Picture 1  Consumer and Producer Surplus 
The solving process of the DEP, involves a series of specific stages that are followed 
in an on-going basis by the Operator of the Electricity Market, by taking into 
consideration a series of information. 
Initially, the Operator compiles the Day Ahead Schedule, which incorporates the 
hourly power prediction for the specific day. Based on this schedule, which may be 
re-adjusted according to the System needs and the availability of the power 
production units in real time, the Operator issues all the necessary orders for power 
production and the provision of the necessary auxiliary services by the power 
production units. 
During the next stage, records are produced that contain entries regarding each hourly 
period for each unit, with the energy quantity (MWh) that should have been produced 
by each unit, the energy quantity (MWh) that is actually produced by each unit as it is 
registered by the corresponded energy meters and the quantities of the auxiliary 
services (MW) that are offered by each unit and are registered by the Energy Control 
System of the Operator. Energy Producers and Importers submit their Infusion Offers, 
which refer to the energy quantity that each one of them predicts, to would be able to 
actually offer to the System during the periods of the Scheduled Day. All the Offers 
are expressed in up to ten steps, in pairs of energy quantity and price. All the offers 
submitted from Renewable Energy Sources units and hydroelectric units, are 
considered non billable. All the Infusion Offers are submitted separately for each 
production unit, each producer submits its Offer for the total unit power and the price 
of each step is higher than the least marginal (or variable) cost of each production 
unit. 
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The last step of DEP, consists of the calculation of the predicted Marginal System  
Price, for each hour of the Day-Ahead Schedule and the notification of all the 
interested parties. Due to the fact, that this price constitutes just a prediction, it’s not 
binding neither for the System Operator, nor for the Infusers.   
 
3.3 Marginal System Price 
The Marginal System Price is the market clearing price of the energy market and it 
represents the steady price in which, everyone infusing electric energy in the system, 
is getting paid for and simultaneously, everyone receiving electric energy from the 
system pay for.  
In order to calculate MSP, the System Operator has to follow a complex algorithmic 
process of optimization, which can be described as follows: 
i) Starting from the unit that offers the lower price for its power, the Operator adds 
subsequently the power of every other unit offering an increasing level of price for 
their power.  
ii) This procedure comes to an end, at the point where the cumulative power obtained 
from the previous step, equals the projected power demand. 
iii) It’s important to mention the fact that, Renewable Energy Sources and 
hydroelectric power plants, always enter first at the abovementioned procedure, 
regardless the price at which they offer their production (actual production cost), as it 
is such required by law, in order to promote the “clean energy power production”. 
Through the same mechanism, some of the thermal units, due to the fact that they 
function with Technical Minimum limitations, enter the system under priority. Those 
offers are defined as Non Billable Offers. 
In essence, Marginal System Price, represents the infusion offer of the last unit 
entering the System, in order to cover the electricity demand. In other words, it 
represents the price at which electricity offer equals electricity demand in the System. 
According to law, there is the capability, if the situation demands it, for an 
administrative (by the state) designation of the Marginal System Price. If no such 
limit exists, MSP gets its maximum price, at the point where the demand is marginally 
zero (limit of demand tends to zero). 
Under this algorithm, as analyzed before, the infusers are motivated to submit offers 
as close to their marginal costs as possible, thus maximizing their probability to join 
the System. The gain obtained by this strategy equals to the difference between MSP 
and each unit’s marginal cost. On the other hand, Infusers that come to submit offers 
over MSP won’t join the System, for the period in question. 
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Marginal System Price, represents the target that is aimed to be determined, through 
the various models, such as gaming theory that describe the electricity market. In a 
fully liberalized electricity market, the wholesale market price keeps up with the 
actual production cost. That cost, defined as Long Run Marginal Cost, takes into 
consideration the fact that the last two years, the Greek electricity producers have to 
pay the cost of the CO2 emissions their productions units emit, through a market 
specifically for this cause. As the Greek electricity production system, is mainly 
comprised of fossil fuel power station, this cost is high and expected to become even 
higher, in the near future. As a result, MSP is expected to reach higher mean levels, as 
liberalization continues on.  
 
Picture 2 CO2 emissions projection for Greece up to year 2020 
It could be considered, that in the wholesale market, depending on the time period, 
there are three phases: 
i) “ex-ante” or “in advance” phase, during which occurs the DEP of the Day-Ahead 
Schedule, 
ii) “real time” phase, during which occurs the actual commitment of the production 
units and are carried out all the necessary adjustments on the Scheduled program, of 
the previous day, 
iii) “ex-post” or “after the fact” phase, during which takes place the necessary 
calculation of the Marginal Deviation Price (the difference between the scheduled 
energy an infuser should have offered and the actual offered energy to the system, 
differentiates the MSP each infuser would be paid) and the monthly market clearing 
of the auxiliary services. 
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3.4 The Unit Commitment (UC) problem 
The Daily Energy Programming and the calculation of the MSP from the System 
Operator, is closely related to the economic programming of the operation of each 
power production unit. The objective of this programming, is to minimize the 
operational costs of the production system, while maintaining a proper level of safety 
and reliability. 
The Unit Commitment (UC) problem refers to the identification of those units which 
must be on line for each hour of the time frame for which the programming is carried 
out, as well as to their production level (power production) at the corresponded time 
frame. Power demands and certain technical characteristics of the production units, 
are considered in order to solve the UC problem. From the relatively small time steps, 
it becomes clear that finding a fair solution in a timely fashion is of great importance, 
as it leads to significant reduction of the System production cost. 
Power demand constantly varies during a 24 hour period. As the demand varies, units’ 
power production should vary also, in order to match the demand. That leads to a 
mandatory variation of the committed power units to the System. Thus, it is necessary 
to compile a program describing when each unit should go on line and when should 
go off line and what would be their infusion power, in order to minimize the System 
production cost per hour. 
The UC problem solving, takes into consideration start-up and shut-down times, 
units’ ramping capability (the speed in which a unit can adjust its power production to 
certain demand), least technical levels of units’ production, back-up power units and 
of course their correspondent costs. Furthermore, during the UC problem solving, it 
can be added as consideration factors electricity exchanges between other Systems 
and the mandatory use of a certain fuel type units (regardless the fact that their use 
might not be the optimum cost-wise solution). 
Taking into consideration the abovementioned data, formulas are formed, expressing 
the total cost of the System for a certain time frame. These formulas lead to the 
computation of the production cost in respect to their expected power production of 
the units. The solution of the UC problem, has as a goal to minimize the value of the 
final cost formula. 
From a mathematical point of view, the UC problem is a large scale optimization 
problem, which contains variables and must satisfy a set of demands and restrictions 
regarding power and the System. Although power limitations of the units and back-up 
power limitations, could be easily integrated in the solving process due to their 
linearity, limitations regarding start-up and shut-down times (synchronization and 
desynchronization) of units present an increased difficulty to be integrated in the 
solution process, due to their non-linear behavior. Furthermore, the use of integer 
variables in order to declare the state of the power units (on-line, off-line), increase 
the complexity of the problem. 
19 
 
4. Strategy Optimization 
As it would be expected, many techniques that deal with the development of the 
optimum Strategy that each infuser should follow in order to survive the competition, 
consolidate its presence and grow its influence, have been studied. In order to 
maximize the social surplus, two are the main pillars that a market should focus on: 
i) minimization of the production cost 
ii) maintaining consumer prices close to the marginal costs of production, transferring 
and distribution of electricity 
Economic theory however, suggests that a regulated market isn’t capable of 
approaching simultaneously and successfully, both of the pillars. Due to its weakness 
to send the necessary concurrent financial signals to all the interested parties, a 
compromise should be made, that usually leads to a strategy non optimum for the 
whole system. As it has been shown by Stoft [38], the strategy that tended to be 
applied more often, was the one of limiting the price of the second pillar and not 
limiting the production cost. In other words, the core of the strategy was to maintain 
consumer prices to levels close to the marginal cost, which would barely allow 
company to cover their expenses and provide them with a “reasonable” Return on 
Equity. On the other hand, a deregulated market under condition for perfect 
competition, may achieve both of those targets. 
The complexity of optimizing the strategy that each party should follow, has proven 
to be extremely challenging. However, mathematical science offers a variety of tools 
and methods, which can provide adequate solutions to the problem. 
Up until now, many different methods and approaches have been utilized, with the 
use of analytical or meta-heuristic
2
 mathematical techniques.  
The behavior modeling of each market player, follow three main categories: 
i) Projection and Response 
ii) Bidding Strategy Development 
iii) Gaming Theory 
                                                          
2
 Heuristic algorithms are approximation algorithms, which follow a strategy that has as a basic goal, 
the elimination of the large number of the examined solutions for finding the global optimum solution 
in their process. They manage to reduce computation time significantly. However, they possess the 
disadvantage that, they conclude to the best solution, among those they actually examine (local 
optimum solution), having no way to prove, that this solution is the actual global optimum. 
Meta-heuristic algorithms are more advanced algorithms that describe a superior strategy which 
leads and modifies other heuristic algorithms to produce solutions, beyond those produced during 
finding of the optimum local ones.  
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In the next few chapters, the main aspects of each method are briefly analyzed and a 
presentation of the main research attempt results in these areas is made, focusing on 
gaming theory methods.  
 
4.1 Projection and Response 
Projection and response methods, have been used in several studies by implementing 
techniques such as making projections with the use of an artificial neuron network 
[39], with the use of stochastic models and timeline theory [40], with mixed-integer 
linear programming methods [41] and so on.  
The approach that is used by the projection and response methods, is highly 
“attractive”, as it implements detailed models and realistic results. It presents, 
however, to main disadvantages. The first one appears as its high dependence of the 
precision of price prediction. Projection models, and especially the successful ones, in 
most usual cases, fail to predict the disproportionately high peaks that appear, when 
real markets are moving borderline and their players choose to manipulate the market. 
These peaks could appear as high as two scale factors than the usual prices.  
The second important disadvantage, is the view of the market as a “black box”. Even 
if there is a indirect model regarding power in the market, this method approaches the 
market through its effect, meaning the price of electricity, and not through its cause, 
which are the offers of the players and price clearing mechanism. So, by definition, 
the behavior of the other players is ignored. Each player is considered to act 
independently in the market. Of course this doesn’t express reality, as electricity 
markets are an oligopoly and their course is depended by the choices of all the 
participants, in various degrees.    
 
4.2 Bidding Strategy Development 
In bidding strategy development problem, each player has developed, somehow, a 
way to estimate the choices of all the other players of the market and by having 
modeled the clearing process mechanism of the market, attempts to make the 
optimum, for his interests, choice.  
Paper [42] studies a power consortium by using “evolving trading agents”, which 
evolve based on a genetic algorithm, in order to determine effective offer strategies 
that would increase its profits. Questions regarding its effectiveness arise, as it is not 
clear how the algorithm actually evolves. 
Paper [43] uses a stochastic method of discrete optimization, the “Marcov decision 
process”, having as goal to maximize the expected profit in a multiple time period 
programming. Rivals’ choices are modeled stochastically, as well as system’s load, 
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but the transferring network is ignored. An important limitation of the suggested 
method is the “dimensionality curse” of the problem, which makes the problem hard 
to solve for realistic systems, under an adequate discrete level. 
Paper [44] studies an optimum offering strategy, with a Monte Carlo simulation. This 
model suggests a stochastic approach for determining choices of the rivals. However, 
it ignores many technical constrictions. 
Paper [45] studies a bi-level optimization model for determining the optimum offer 
strategy. In this model, participants in the electricity market are trying to maximize 
their profit, with the limitation that the Independent System Operator (ISO) 
determines the infused energy quantities and their price, by solving a problem of 
optimal load flow of direct current. All the players have knowledge of their 
opponents’ choices, which lead to a deterministic model. This study allows a 
systematic research of the transferring network limitation affects, to the formation of 
optimum strategies.        
 
4.3 Gaming Theory 
In many everyday cases, the results of a choice a person makes, are depended of the 
choices other people make. Often, this factor of mutual correlation is so powerful, that 
modeling it, deems as necessity. Game (or gaming) Theory, deals with the analysis of 
those cases where there decision makers whose competitive decisions, determine the 
final outcome of the process. The most representative case of a game, that was mainly 
responsible for developing gaming theory, is the decisions made in an oligopolistic 
market. A classic market that is characterized by its oligopoly character, is the 
electricity market.  
The term “game”, refers to the state during which two or more players (people or 
collective entities), with possibly contradictive goals, choose ways to act, based on a 
predetermined set of rules. During a game, are created conditions of competitive 
codependence, where the goal of each player is to satisfy its own interest. The 
outcome of the game is a combination of choices of all the participating players. 
The term “player”, refers to each unit making decision that is implicated to the game 
and contributes to its evolvement. A fundamental condition, is the fact that each 
player is “rational” and attempts to maximize its profit or minimize its loss, based 
always to the rules of the game and the resources and information that exist in its 
disposal. 
The term “strategy”, refers to a decision a player makes, among the sum of all 
feasible choices that could be followed with every move, until the game is over. 
Optimum strategy is considered a strategy that leads to maximizing or minimizing an 
objective cost formula, which characterizes each specific player. 
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Finally, in each game the “payoff matrix” is compiled, that includes the game results 
for every possible strategy combination, in cost units.  
 
4.3.1 Types of Games 
According to bibliography, certain type of games could be defined, based on certain 
fundamental distinctions. 
i) According to the number of moves of each player 
“Static Games” are the games where players have a feasible sum of decisions, choose 
one of those and get rewards that depend on the choices made. These games, known 
also as “simultaneous move games”, presuppose one and only move from each player, 
which is carried out simultaneously by all players. 
“Dynamic Games” are the games where players, in contrast to the static ones, carry 
out more than one moves, which are likely to be simultaneous ones or consecutive. 
Subcategory of these games, are the “repeated games”, where take place reexecutions 
of the same simpler game by entering “threats” or “promises”, affecting players’ 
behavior in future executions of the simpler game. Subcategory of these games, are 
the “infinitely repeated games”. 
ii) According to the sum of feasible strategies (decisions) 
According to whether the sum of the feasible strategies is finite or not, games could 
be distincted to “infinite games” or “finite games”. A secondary distinction could be 
made, in regards to whether the sum of the decisions is discrete (discrete games) or 
continuous (continuous games). Apparently, continuous games are also infinite 
games. 
iii) According to the capability of cooperation 
Based on the potential for cooperation or negotiation between players on a game, 
games are separated between “bargaining or cooperative games”. On the contrary, in 
the games, where there is no mechanism available to impose players to agree in 
certain mutually accepted decisions and execute them (and therefore distrust is 
evolved), are called “non-cooperative games”. 
iv) According to information each player receives 
Based on the information players have, regarding the knowledge of the reward 
formula (a formula which determines the reward of each player for each combination 
of moves of all the players) each player acts on, games are distincted as “complete 
information games” and “incomplete information games”. 
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A further distinction, regarding dynamic games exist. More specifically, if in every 
move in a dynamic game, each player known the full history of the game, up to the 
point making its move, then the game is considered as a “perfect information games”, 
in oppose to “imperfect information game”. 
Common Knowledge 
The concept of common knowledge, is fundamental in gaming theory and refers to 
knowledge which all players possess and furthermore, are aware of the fact that all the 
other players possess it, too. 
v) According to the total number of players 
“Two player games”, have been studied extensively and have lead to specific 
conclusions, so they could be considered as a distinct category. Generally, the term 
“n-player game” is used to describe the number of players in a game. 
vi) According to the total player reward 
If the total reward players receive from the game, remain constant, then the game is 
called “constant sum game”. If actually, this reward equals zero, then the game is 
called “zero-sum game”. In these games, the increase of the reward of a player, results 
to an equal amount decrease of the other players’ reward. In case there are only two 
players, the reward of the first player is the exact opposite reward of the second (u1=-
u2). This case describes “strictly opposing” interests. 
 
4.3.2 Pure and Mixed Strategies 
The concept of “pure strategy” of a player describes the potential decisions that could 
be made, in any possible situation of the game. If the strategies of all players are 
known to a “referee”, he could execute the complete game. The uncertainty of a 
player, regarding the choices of another player, is described by the concept of “mixed 
strategy”, which leads to the application of a statistical distribution to compute 
probabilities, over the sum of its clear strategies. 
 
4.3.3 Normal Form of the Game (Static Games of Complete 
Information) 
The normal form of the game determines: 
i) the players of the game 
ii) the available strategies of each players 
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iii) the reward that each player receives for any possible outcome of strategies of 
players 
Definition: If the area of possible strategies for a n-player game is considered as 
S1,…,Sn and the correspondent reward formulas are u1,…,un, where  
ui:S1xS2x…xSn→Ɽ. This game is described as G = {S1,…,Sn;u1,…,un}. 
 
4.3.4 Dominated Strategies 
Definition: In a game of normal form G = {S1,…,Sn;u1,…,un}, let’s assume si
’
, si
’’
 as 
two members of the sum Si of the possible strategies by player i. Strategy si
’’
 is 
dominated by si
’
 if, for every possible combination of strategies by the other players, 
the reward of player i, when he chooses strategy si
’’
, is less or equal to the reward he 
receives if he chooses strategy si
’
.  
If, in other words ui(s1,…, si
’’,…,sn)≤ ui(s1,…, si
’,…,sn) for every possible 
combination of (s1,…,si-1,si+1,…,sn). 
If the inequality is always valid, then the strategy si
’’
 is strictly dominated by strategy 
si
’
. 
“Rational” player never choose strictly dominated strategies, given the fact that there 
is no probable estimation regarding the “moves” (strategies) of the rest of the players 
as to which strictly dominated strategy would be the optimum. 
 
4.3.5 Game Solving 
Key aim of game theory is to conclude to a “convention”, regarding the outcome of 
the game. Unfortunately, that is not always possible to be achieved. Even if, there 
could be a convention, that would not necessarily be, the outcome of the actual game. 
In the next paragraphs are presented, some methods creating such conventions. 
i) Repeated elimination of strictly dominated strategies 
Given the admission that “rational” players would not choose to follow strictly 
dominated strategies, a solving approach of game is the repeated elimination of those 
strategies, for each player, up to the point there would be only one strategy left for 
each player. This approach of course, suggests that the fact that all players are 
“rational”, is common knowledge. 
A disadvantage of this method is the fact, that very often this procedure results to 
ambiguous results regarding the outcome of the game, given that many strategies 
“survive” the elimination process. 
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ii) Nash equilibrium point in pure strategies 
Given that gaming theory aims to predicting the outcome of the game, it must 
conclude to a prediction that each player would be willing to follow. The concept of 
equilibrium is tightly connected with games. The term equilibrium, refers to players 
having chosen those strategies that have lead the game in such outcome, so that by the 
revelation of the chosen strategies by the end of the game, none of the players would 
be dissatisfied for its choices. Strategies that lead to the equilibrium point are called 
safety strategies and according to the previous description they eradicate the motive 
for unilateral change of strategy, as none of the players has a motive to diverge from 
it. In this case, the value of the game is the outcome matrix that corresponds to the 
pair of equilibrium strategies. This equilibrium state is often called Nash equilibrium. 
Definition: In a n-player game with normal form G = {S1,…,Sn;u1,…,un}, strategies 
(s1
*,…, sn
*
) consist a Nash equilibrium point, if for each player i is valid that 
si
*
=max ui(s1
*,…, si-1
*
, si+1
*,…, sn
*
). 
 
4.3.6 Finding Nash equilibrium point 
There are several classical approaches for finding Nash equilibrium point. The most 
simple is the exhausting search method, which is the listing of all the possible 
combinations of players’ strategies and the following checking of whether the 
definition of Nash equilibrium is satisfied. 
Also, the repeated elimination of strictly dominated strategies method, could be used. 
It should be taken into consideration though, that the method produces valid results of 
a Nash equilibrium point, if the procedure concludes to a single strategy combination. 
The general approach is the algebraic solving of the equation system, which comes of 
the definition of Nash equilibrium point. Although this method appears more 
“elegant”, it’s likely to be inapplicable due to the complexity of certain games. 
Finally, there can be used formulas of optimum reaction of the players. By the use of 
those formulas, the determination of Nash equilibrium point, could be achieved either 
graphically as their point of intersection or algorithmically by a repeated calculation 
of each player’s optimum reaction to the reaction of the others. 
 
4.3.7 Uniqueness and singularity of Nash equilibrium point 
A game, might have one, none or multiple points of equilibrium in pure strategies. 
Nash’s theorem guaranties that a finite game has at least one Nash equilibrium point, 
but this might contain mixed strategies. This could be considered as a sub case of the 
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Nash equilibrium point in mixed strategies, but the fact is that these points are much 
harder to be calculated and they conclude to less clear results. 
 
4.3.8 Classic Models for Electricity Market  
The most common models that have been used in the process of studying electricity 
market, are the following: 
i) Cournot Model 
In its classical version, Cournot model regards a sum of players which limit their 
decisions in choosing the quantity of the good they would offer to the market. This 
quantity is a non negative one and it’s not upper bounded. The value at which players 
get rewarded is a decaying formula of the total mentioned quantity. As a game, is 
considered a static, non-cooperative game of complete information. 
ii) Bertrand Model 
This model, unlike Cournot Model, players chose the price at they would offer the 
quantity of the good. This price is a non negative one and it’s not upper bounded. The 
quantity that finally would be offered is in correlation to their price and that of the 
competition. As a game, is considered a static, non-cooperative game of complete 
information. 
iii) Stackelberg Model 
Stackelberg model is a dynamic market model, where a player possesses a dominant 
place (dominant firm or leader), while the rest of the players are considered to 
subordinate followers or firms. At this game, the dominant player decides first about 
the quantity he desires and the rest follow, while knowing his move. As a game, is 
considered dynamic, non-cooperative, perfect and complete information. 
iv) Supply function equilibrium models 
Supply function equilibrium models are used in many variations to study electricity 
markets, as are the closest ones in the actual condition games. At that model, players 
choose the offer function (quantity-price) of the good.        
------------ 
Creating strategic offers, as presented so far, has lead to the creation of very realistic 
models of the actual problem that face participants in an electricity market. The  
element however, that up until now has been ignored, is the strategic correlation 
between players, that’s their reactions in the choices of their opponents. The study of 
these correlations could lead to much qualitative conclusions regarding the course of 
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the electricity market. This kind of analysis, is feasible through the gaming theory, 
which has been used extensively for analyzing energy markets. 
There have been presented many study models of electricity market, which are based 
on classic econometric models, adapted to the energy market. The two most dominant 
categories are the Cournot models and the supply function equilibrium models. 
 
4.3.8.1 Comparison between the Cournot models and the supply 
function equilibrium models (SFEM)    
One of the fundamental advantages of Cournot equilibrium points, is the fact that they 
can be computed much easier than the respective equilibrium points of SFEM 
[46],[47]. Another characteristic of them, is the commonly accepted flexibility they 
present, especially during modeling technical restrictions and contracts. Furthermore, 
a significant advantage of Cournot models is, that producers appearing having certain 
characteristics of behavior regarding long term decisions about their future installed 
power, are well modeled [48],[49]. Better behavior of Cournot models regarding long 
term estimations, is to be expected, given that electricity consumption presents nearly 
zero elasticity in real time, while in long term, the model can integrate its affects. 
On the other hand, Cournot models, don’t respond to actual market conditions. The 
players don’t submit quantities of electricity, but functions of offers. The indirect 
modeling of the offer submission procedure, varies significantly the actual available 
strategies of players. Also, it is commonly accepted that the biggest weakness of the 
Cournot points of equilibrium, is their dependence from the supposed curve (function) 
of demand. This curve seems to be difficult to be determined with precision actually 
[47]. Cournot points of equilibrium present extremely high sensitivity with the 
elasticity of the demand curve, which leads to unacceptable points of equilibrium, 
when the supposed curve of demand is very low [51],[47],[50]. 
SFEM are considered, fairly, as a more realistic modeling attempt of the actual 
markets [46],[47],[52]. Unfortunately, they don’t possess the “attractive” 
characteristics of Cournot models, regarding modeling construction and computation 
[51],[47]. Also, they present significantly intense problems in regards to the 
uniqueness and singularity of the equilibrium point in pure strategies, even in models 
that don’t contain transferring network restrictions. Furthermore, they often appear 
significant problem in calculating the optimum response of a player. 
 
4.3.8.2 Cournot models 
A fair implementation of the Cournot model regarding electricity market, which 
involves transferring network restrictions, is presented in paper [53]. This approach 
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has been used extensively to model electricity market and has become the basis of 
many papers following similar methodology. In this paper, producer’s problem is 
expressed as a bi-level problem of optimization, where each player attempts to 
maximize its profits, based on the limitation that the Independent System Operator 
(ISO), solves the problem of maximizing social surplus. Solving process is based on 
the implementation of Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions. Finding Nash equilibrium 
point, is achieved through consecutive calculation of optimum reactions for each 
player, until convergence in achieved. It should be noticed that, uniqueness and 
singularity of Nash equilibrium point, appears problematic. The computational 
algorithm, will converge to the equilibrium point, if that exists. It is likely however, 
this point won’t exist or that many equilibrium points exist. It has been shown [54] 
that an equilibrium point collapses, when transferring network restrictions are applied. 
Paper [55] ignores transferring network limitations and computes all the necessary 
conditions in the equilibrium point. These conditions are entered subsequently, in an 
existing algorithm of production programming for multiple time periods. This method 
has the advantage that utilizes existing software and the fact that it produces solutions 
for multiple time periods. However, the simplified assumptions and the solving 
difficulties on real size problems, render it difficult for application.   
In paper [56], a Cournot model is used to study the problem of production expansion. 
Given the long-term character of the problem, the application of a Cournot model 
appears valid. The solving process is based on a bi-level algorithm. In the second 
level of the algorithm, each player computes its optimum reaction to the choices of his 
opponents, while the first level of the algorithm seeks repeatedly the equilibrium point 
of this long-term game. The implementation of this model concluded that, liberalized 
electricity markets would be more reliable long-term, in relation with a monopoly 
market. 
Paper [57] expands the use of the Cournot model to include multiple interconnected 
electricity markets, while taking into consideration transferring network constrictions 
through a simplified network model. The problem formed is a non-linear optimization 
one. 
All the previous papers and most of the existing, in general, study games of complete 
information. The reason is that incomplete information games, are much harder to be 
solved and require the study of mixed strategies, which is much harder and in many 
cases come to unclear conclusions.  
Paper [58] studies both those cases. When having incomplete information, it considers 
that players, in conditions of uncertainty, try to maximize their expected profit and 
minimize its dispersion. The study produces analytical formulas for calculating 
equilibrium points. However, the simplified assumptions used, prohibit the use of 
them in real markets, given that all the technical constrictions are ignored. The use of 
a common cost function for all the production units, introduces a significant error, as 
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the cost of each unit is mainly dependent of its type and technology level and could 
vary easily by 200%. Lastly, the lack of any technical constriction could lead to 
unacceptable equilibrium points, where certain units may present negative power 
levels. 
 
4.3.8.3 Supply function equilibrium models (SFEM)  
Given that, a way to compute the equilibrium point is the consecutive calculation of 
the optimum reaction of a player to the choices of his rivals until convergence is 
achieved, many of the models, which determine the optimum offer strategy, could be 
expanded to compute the matching equilibrium point. In cases where the optimum 
strategy of a player is calculated based on a deterministic model of the rivals’ options, 
the problem could be solved for each player, assuming as stables the choices of its 
rivals. In cases where, there is a statistical estimation through probabilities, regarding 
rivals’ choices, that expansion could be challenging. Undoubtedly, that would have 
been very useful, as it could solve games of incomplete information and it would 
define the equilibrium points in mixed strategies, which is proven to exist in finite 
games (Bayesian Nash equilibrium points). 
Paper [59] studies the affect of possible coalitions, which a player could make, in its 
offer strategies. The methodology followed is quite difficult to be implemented in 
realistic markets, since uncertainty issues arise regarding the singularity of the 
equilibrium point in pure strategies and the computational load, of examining all the 
possible coalitions, is very high. 
By the method of consecutive calculation of the optimum reaction, paper [60] solves 
the game where the maximization problem of each producer, is based on price 
estimations that will prevail in the market, in respect to unit power production of the 
player. The specific problem is a multiple time period problem. The repeated 
algorithm is executed “enough” times, as they are necessary in order to determine the 
behavior patterns of the players. In spite of the satisfactory precision of the model, 
regarding modeling of the technical constrictions, applying the paper results in real 
problems, arises significant difficulties. The necessary number of “enough” times is 
arbitrary and the identification of the behavior patterns depends on each execution, as 
its calculation is made heuristically.  
Paper [61] studies a game of incomplete information and a simulation model of the 
electricity market is presented. The simulation is based on the repeated determination 
of players’ reactions, which use an adaptive learning tool to compensate their 
incomplete information regarding choices and cost parameters of their rivals. The 
paper concludes that, for an increasing number of players, the price of electricity is 
reduced and the algorithm convergence rate is increased. 
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As already mentioned, the computation of equilibrium points in mixed strategies is 
particularly difficult process. Paper [62] studies a game of incomplete information. 
This game is much closer to real problems, given the fact that in actual markets, the 
players are not aware of the cost function of their rivals and aren’t able to calculate 
deterministically their reward for each choice they make. In this paper, the players 
model stochastically the unknown parameters of their rivals’ costs. An “expected 
payoff matrix” is formed and conditions that define Nash equilibrium point are 
solved. While this approach seems to deal with the problem finally, its 
implementation reveals enormous requirement in computational time and power, due 
to the extremely large matrices created.   
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5. Conclusions - Future Research 
Liberalization of the electricity market, has set a radical change in the way its 
participants realize their role, organization and goals. All parties joining this "new" 
market, need new tools for market analysis and a guide to assist them with their 
production programming.  
This dissertation, focused on analyzing the Greek electricity market, in order one to 
obtain the necessary familiarity, with the way it, nowadays, operates. Furthermore, a 
bibliographical review, of the most prominent strategies to address the problem of 
producers' and system's cost optimization, was presented. Gaming theory methods 
were especially focused on, as they appear to have such characteristics that render 
them suitable to deal with this issue.   
Electricity market, can be considered as a system that consists of players aiming to 
maximize their profit functions, through interaction with each other. Producers are 
forced to make decisions in an uncertain environment, regarding energy demand, their 
rivals choices and the cost characteristics of their competitors. These factors, could be 
modeled in a way, that in conjunction with the risk profile of each participant, could 
help significantly their decision making process.   
Liberalization of the power electricity industry is assumed to increase the gains for 
both the producers and the final consumers. Bibliographic review revealed that ISO 
has a prominent role that could lead to forging alliances between the interested 
parties. 
Cournot models, as they are implemented in papers analyzed, could significantly 
contribute in analyzing thoroughly the effects of basic parameters, such as market 
concentration and demand elasticity in the equilibrium points of the market.  
Public Power Corporation constitutes the leading player in electricity market and 
given the granted transferring network restrictions, determines, more or less, the way 
electricity market functions and the MSP. In this sense, System Operator, has a very 
important role to play, that could become more efficient with a careful 
implementation of one of the reviewed models. 
During the last few years, a significant increase of the Renewable Energy Sources 
installed power was realized. This fact induces critical changes to Daily Energy 
Planning of the System. A future research could focus on how gaming theory models 
could successfully integrate to them, the technical and economical challenges posses 
for the Greek electricity system this particular development.      
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